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Thinking Sex Politically:
Rethinking ‘‘Sex’’ in Plato’s Republic
This essay is concerned with the category of
sex, where sex means ‘‘sex diﬀerence,’’ as dis-
tinct from ‘‘sexual diﬀerence’’ (a psychoanalytic
category), ‘‘gender’’ (a category describing his-
torical, cultural, and institutional demands or
norms), and ‘‘sexuality’’ (which refers to sexual
desire and/or its orientation). Its aim is to
show that we cannot adequately think about
‘‘sex’’ politically without also thinking about it
philosophically. ‘‘Thinking philosophically,’’ in
this essay, means thinking through a text from
the history of philosophy—Plato’s Republic—and
critically examining the assumptions of some of
the English translations of and commentaries
on it, in the light of recent theoretical debates.
The aim is to make a general point about the
thinking of sex that holds across disciplinary
boundaries.
1
Sex is usually understood to be a natural
‘‘given,’’ and the question of identifying what sex
is is still usually presumed to be one that can be
settled empirically, probably by biologists. How-
ever, recent work in both biology and philosophy
has shown that ‘‘sex’’ is not merely an empirical
issue but, rather, a more complex categorical and
therefore philosophical one, though some of the
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reasons for thinking this are themselves empirical.
2
Brieﬂy, at the level of
anatomy, genital morphology, chromosomal conﬁguration, and hormone
distribution, the assumption of a clear binary sex diﬀerence is not con-
ﬁrmed.
3
The incidence of human intersexuals suggests that it is the cate-
gory of binary sex diﬀerence itself, not the empirical distribution of its
characteristics, that demands investigation. The existence of the intersexed
reveals that sex is an epistemological and ontological problem and that
the presumption of its justiﬁcation on the basis of an appeal to allegedly
straightforwardly perceptible facts is mistaken.
4
Transsexualism poses fur-
ther philosophical problems in relation to the concept of sex. The fact that
one can change sex raises the existential question of what it is to be sexed,
and not just to be sexed as this or that but to be sexed at all, as well as the
ontological question of what sex itself is.
Despite the intelligibility of these questions, however, the presumption of
binary sex diﬀerence is enduring, and resistance to the philosophical ques-
tioning of the category is strong. To understand this we need to investigate
how the concept ‘‘sex’’ functions in relation to other concepts.When we are
careful to distinguish it from related concepts like ‘‘gender,’’ ‘‘sex’’ is used as
an abstract noun of classiﬁcation referring to ‘‘the sumof the characteristics
that distinguish organisms on the basis of their reproductive function,’’ and
also to ‘‘either of the two categories, male or female, into which organisms
are placed on this basis.’’
5
As such, the speciﬁcity of the concept concerns
the status attributed to its two terms,male and female. As a distinct concept,
‘‘sex’’ involves the idea that being-male and being-female are the natural,
determining bases for the deﬁnition ofwhat it is to be a girl or a boy or aman
or a woman. ‘‘Sex,’’ that is, is generally conceived as a concept that signiﬁes
something about the immutability and essential nature of its terms, such
that they signify as foundational and not themselves susceptible to deter-
mination. (‘‘Male’’ and ‘‘female’’ are treated as natural kinds.) With regard
to human existence, the function of the concept of sex has largely been to
deﬁne being-male and being-female as foundational to, and to a great extent
determining of, the social and psychological being of men and women.
To the extent that it thus functions ideologically, as a structuring part in
a pattern of beliefs related to the social forms of gendered existence, sex is
an eminently political concept. Hoary old presumptions about the univer-
sality, neutrality, or purity of the practice of the discipline of philosophymay
continue to allow some to believe that it has nothing to do with politics. But
even where philosophy has become overtly political by becoming feminist,
Rethinking ‘‘Sex’’ in Plato’s Republic 615
thinking politically about sex has rarely involved the critical philosophical
analysis of the concept itself. Such an analysis requires an investigation of
the function of ‘‘sex’’ in its conceptual constellations in diﬀerent linguis-
tic and historical contexts and can begin only with speciﬁc examples from
which we might hope to draw more general conclusions.
This essay focuses on one such example: the function of the concept of
sex in the English translations of and commentaries on the arguments for
the proposals concerning the role of women in Plato’s Republic. The main
claim in this essay, based on a strict textual analysis, is that there is in fact no
concept of ‘‘sex,’’ as the general term for the categories of male and female,
in the classical Greek text of Plato’s Republic. On the basis of this claim, a
new interpretation of the relevant passages of theRepublic becomes possible
and causes us to call into question the apparent ‘‘givenness’’ of the concept
of sex and to appreciate its historical contingency, to see that it is a distinc-
tively ‘‘modern’’ concept.
6
In what follows I shall ﬁrst examine Plato’s main
argument for the second and third of three proposals concerning the role
of women in the Republic from the standpoint of some of the most famil-
iar English translations and feminist responses, where the concept of sex
is freely employed. I shall then attempt to justify the claim that there is no
concept of sex in the Republic, reexamining the argument and some related
passages from the Laws accordingly. Finally, I shall consider some of the
broader philosophical consequences of this claim and its implications for
contemporary feminism as an indication of what it might now mean for us
to think ‘‘sex’’ politically.
The Relevance of Sex
In what is conventionally numbered book 5 of Plato’s Republic, Socrates7
makes three proposals concerning the ruling ‘‘guardian’’ class of the Repub-
lic, proposals which seem radical and shocking to his interlocutors: (1) that
wives and children should be held in common; (2) that men and women
should receive an equal education; and (3) that women should participate
in all aspects of governance. Disagreements in the feminist literature have
largely centered on the second and third proposals.
8
As the second (a radi-
cal transformation of education in its broadest sense of upbringing and
acculturation) is the condition of possibility of the third (participation in
governance), these two proposals are part of a single program of social
and political transformation which, mutatis mutandis, is recognizable in
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the actual transformations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—
regional, national, and continental variations notwithstanding.
Whatever Plato’s intentions in its initial presentation, various forms of
one crucial aspect of his main argument in favor of these proposals have
been central, either implicitly or explicitly, to both liberal and socialist femi-
nism. The argument, insofar as it has interested Plato’s feminist readers,
may be summarized as follows. According to Socrates in Plato’s Republic,
the diﬀerence between the sexes (which is not, in itself, denied) is not such
that men or women, qua men or qua women, are suited to any one kind
of work or any distinct social or cultural existence. Rather, the diﬀerence
between the sexes is reduced to the diﬀerent roles of men and women in
reproduction and is said to be irrelevant to their capacities for work. Despite
Plato’s generalized sexism—his apparent belief that men are superior to
women in all things—the argument seems to support the view that it is
the diﬀerent treatment and cultural expectations of boys and girls and men
and women that produce many of the diﬀerences in capacity and charac-
ter that people are wont to ascribe, erroneously, to the ‘‘natural’’ diﬀerences
between the sexes.
Despite profound diﬀerences in the various feminist interpretations of
Plato’s position and its wider implications, there has been a common as-
sumption that the concept of ‘‘sex’’ plays a central role in it.This assumption
is, of course, not unmotivated by the termsof the text itself, and inparticular
by the references throughout to ‘‘male’’ (arren) and ‘‘female’’ (thēlus). Having
earlier compared the military wing of the guardian class to watchdogs, Soc-
rates argues for the equal education of men and women by extending his
comparison into an analogy (here Socrates reports his questions and his
interlocutor’s answers):
‘‘Ought female watchdogs [tas thēleias tōn phulakōn kunōn] to perform
the same guard-duties as male [hoi arrenes], and watch and hunt and
so on with them? Or ought they to stay at home on the grounds that
the bearing and rearing of their puppies incapacitates them from other
duties, so that the whole burden of the care of the ﬂock falls on the
males?’’ ‘‘They should share all duties, though we should treat the
females as the weaker and the males as the stronger [hōs asthenesterais
chrōmetha, tois de hōs ischuroterois].’’ ‘‘And can you use any animal for
the same purpose as another,’’ I asked, ‘‘unless you bring it up and train
it in the same way?’’ ‘‘No.’’ ‘‘So if we are going to use men and women
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for the same purposes, we must teach them the same things?’’ ‘‘Yes.’’
(451d–452a)
9
For Socrates, this argument establishes thatmen andwomen should receive
the same education if they are to be used for the same purposes, but it does
not establish that they can and should be so used. In the elaboration of his
case, the twoquestions of the possibility and the desirability of Socrates’ pro-
posals are condensed into the question of whether or not they are contrary
to nature, as the major objection to them will claim that they are. Because
of the limitations of the guard dog analogy, Socrates is aware that most of
the work in the argument is still to be done, a point that, at ﬁrst sight, Aris-
totle’s surprisingly literal objection (‘‘It is absurd to argue, from the analogy
of animals, that men and women should follow the same pursuits, for ani-
mals have not to manage a household’’)
10
seemingly fails to acknowledge.
According to Socrates:
The ﬁrst thing we have to agree on, then, is whether these proposals
are feasible [dunata] or not. For, whether it’s asked in joke or in earnest,
we must allow people to ask the question, Is the female of the human
species naturally capable of taking part in all the occupations of the
male [poteron dunatē phusis hē anthrōpinē hē thēleia tē tou arrenos genous
koivōnēsai eis hapanta ta erga], or in none, or in some only? (452e–453a)
As the question is introduced with the interrogative particle ara, a negative
answer is expected.The implication, then, is that the capability of the female
is ‘‘in question,’’ in the sense of ‘‘in doubt.’’
11
Accordingly, Socrates formu-
lates a serious objection to his own proposals, on behalf of the doubters, by
referring back to the previously agreed-upon principle that ‘‘each man was
naturally [kata phusin] ﬁtted for a particular job of his own’’ (370b):
‘‘Well,’’ he [the doubter] will continue, ‘‘isn’t there a very great natu-
ral diﬀerence between men and women [estin oun hopōs ou pampolu
diapherei gunē andros tēn phusin]?’’ And when we admit that too, he will
ask uswhether we ought not to give themdiﬀerent roles tomatch these
natural diﬀerences [oukoun allo kai ergon hekaterō prosēkei prostattein to
kata tēn hautou phusin].When we say yes, he will ask, ‘‘Then aren’t you
making a mistake and contradicting yourselves, when you go on to say
that men and women should follow the same occupations, in spite of
the great natural diﬀerence between them [pleiston kechōrismenēn phu-
sin echontas]?’’ (453b–c)
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Socrates’ answer to this objection, which aims to clear away the appear-
ance of internal inconsistency, constitutes the main argument for both the
second and the third proposals. It is the objection, he says, that is faulty, in
not being able to distinguish between merely verbal oppositions and more
important ‘‘distinctions in kind’’ (mē dunasthai kat’ eidē diairoumenoi) (454a)
and in not considering ‘‘what kind [eidos] of sameness or diﬀerence of nature
we mean, and what our intention was when we laid down the principle that
diﬀerent natures should have diﬀerent jobs, similar natures similar jobs’’
(454b). ‘‘We never meant,’’ Socrates says,
‘‘that natures are the same or diﬀerent in an unqualiﬁed sense [ou pan-
tōs tēn autēn kai tēn heteran phusin etithemetha], but only with refer-
ence to the kind of sameness or diﬀerence which is relevant to vari-
ous employments. For instance, we should regard a man and a woman
with medical ability as having the same nature [hoion iatrikon men
kai iatrikēn tēn psuchēn ontas tēn autēn phusin echein elegomen]. Do you
agree?’’ ‘‘Yes.’’ ‘‘But a doctor and a carpenter [iatrikon de kai tektoni-
kon] we should reckon as having diﬀerent natures.’’12 ‘‘Yes, entirely.’’
‘‘Then if men or women as a sex [to tōn andrōn kai to tōn gunaikōn genos]
appear to be qualiﬁed for diﬀerent skills or occupations,’’ I said, ‘‘we
shall assign these to each accordingly.’’ (454c–e)
Given the previous agreement on the ‘‘very great’’ natural diﬀerence be-
tween men and women, the situation is now that the interlocutors are
agreed both that men and women have diﬀerent natures (as men and
women), and that some men and women have the same nature (as doc-
tors, for example).This is not a contradiction in Socrates’ argument, but the
exposition of an apparent contradiction in the beliefs of his interlocutors,
due to the same mistake that Socrates identiﬁed earlier: failure to ask in
what the diﬀerence between the natures of men and women consists and
how that diﬀerence is relevant. The next step will be to determine just this:
‘‘Then if men or women as a sex [to tōn andrōn kai to tōn gunaikōn genos]
appear to be qualiﬁed for diﬀerent skills or occupations,’’ I said, ‘‘we
shall assign these to each accordingly; but if the only diﬀerence appar-
ent between them is that the female bears [to men thēlu tiktein] and the
male begets [to de arren ocheuein] we shall not admit that this is a dif-
ference relevant for our purpose, but shall maintain that our male and
female Guardians [tous te phulakas hēmin kai tas gunaikas] ought to fol-
low the same occupations.’’ (454d–e)
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According to Julia Annas, the ‘‘crucial point’’ in Plato’s argument is not
whether there are diﬀerences between men and women—indisputably,
there are—but whether these sex diﬀerences, which are certainly relevant
in procreation, have any bearing on men and women’s professional capa-
bilities.
13
For Annas and many other feminist readers, Plato was able to see
that these diﬀerences are only illegitimately cited as the justiﬁcation for
women’s exclusion from participation in education, administration of the
state, governance, and so on. For others still, this insight extends to Plato’s
ability to see that what women currently are and do is not what women could
be and could do under diﬀerent, more favorable conditions (principally, with
more favorable educational opportunities).
14
Given the conservative or reactionary role that ‘‘sex’’ tends to continue
to play in discussions of the capabilities, characteristics, and proper pur-
suits of men and women, it is not surprising that feminists should empha-
size the general irrelevance of the fact (if such it is) of sex diﬀerence to
professional capability and argue that the fact of sex diﬀerence does not
translate into necessarily determined intellectual or psychological diﬀer-
ences.To the extent that readers have found book 5 of theRepublic to contain
arguments congenial to feminism, it is therefore also not surprising that
Plato’s position is couched in these terms.
15
According to this interpretation,
Socrates’ argument is pitted against his interlocutors’ assumption that sex
diﬀerence—the fact that women bear and men beget—is a valid basis for
doubting that women are capable of sharing in men’s work (most speciﬁ-
cally in governance). Despite their varying degrees of sympathy for Plato,
most feminist commentators thus agree that the crucial point in his argu-
ment is the shift in emphasis away from ‘‘sex’’ as an explanatory category
in the social and political existence of women toward ‘‘gender,’’ the set of
socially determined behaviors and characteristics prescribed for and—to a
greater or lesser extent—lived out by women. It is thus generally assumed
that the modern category of ‘‘sex’’ is somehow operative in, or can be read
back into, the arguments in book 5 of the Republic.
The Relevance of Genos
However, from the modern perspective there is a conceptual lacuna in
Plato’s text which most English translations and interpretations—includ-
ing the feminist interpretations—do not merely miss but in fact conceal.
Moreover, this lacuna occurs in precisely that passage in which, according
to Annas and others, the crucial point is made, namely:
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‘‘Then if men or women as a sex [to tōn andrōn kai to tōn gunaikōn genos]
appear to be qualiﬁed for diﬀerent skills or occupations,’’ [Socrates]
said, ‘‘we shall assign these to each accordingly; but if the only diﬀer-
ence apparent between them is that the female bears [to men thēlu tik-
tein] and the male begets [to de arren ocheuein] we shall not admit that
this is a diﬀerence relevant for our purpose, but shall maintain that
ourmale and female Guardians [tous te phulakas hēmin kai tas gunaikas]
ought to follow the same occupations.’’ (454d–e)
What is perhaps most interesting about this—the crux of Socrates’ argu-
ment—is obscured, I shall now argue, by the translation of genos as ‘‘sex,’’
and by the use of the English terms ‘‘male’’ and ‘‘female’’ in the ﬁnal line.
In classical Greek there is no distinct word for ‘‘sex.’’ The word genos,
which is sometimes translated as ‘‘sex,’’ primarilymeans ‘‘race,’’ ‘‘stock,’’ and
‘‘kin,’’ as well as ‘‘oﬀspring,’’ ‘‘tribe,’’ ‘‘generation,’’ and ‘‘kind.’’ In the pas-
sages under consideration, every timePlato’s genos is translated into English
as ‘‘sex,’’ the more general ‘‘race’’ or (better) ‘‘kind’’ would make equally as
much sense.What, then, justiﬁes the translation of genos as ‘‘sex’’?
Inmodern English, ‘‘sex,’’ as we have said, is an abstract noun of classiﬁca-
tion referring to ‘‘the sum of the characteristics that distinguish organisms
on the basis of their reproductive function,’’ and also to ‘‘either of the two
categories, male or female, into which organisms are placed on this basis.’’
‘‘Sex’’ as a conceptually distinct term is alignedwith nature itself, in contrast
with the conventional attributes of ‘‘gender.’’ As such, ‘‘sex’’ functions con-
ceptually (and also allegedly empirically) as the basis for, but is not identical
with, the categories ‘‘man’’ and ‘‘woman’’ (a species-speciﬁc version of the
adult forms of male and female) and the characteristics of gender. If ‘‘sex’’
is a general term referring to the two categories ‘‘male’’ and ‘‘female,’’ the
category according to which the ‘‘nature’’ of men and women is ultimately
determined, there is no concept of sex in Plato’s Republic. For each time
genos is used in the Republic in relation tomen or women ormale or female,
it is attached to one or the other in order to specify men or women or male or
female as a class in distinction from this or that man or woman or male or
female animal. The word is never used (indeed, it cannot be used) as a sin-
gular term to refer to a distinction in kind covering both men and women
ormale and female.That is, it is never used as the general term ‘‘sex’’ is used
in English.
16
And although the concepts of ‘‘male’’ and ‘‘female’’ seem to be
unproblematically recognizable in the Greek arren and thēlus, the absence
of any concept of sex as a general term that designates what kind of cate-
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gories ‘‘male’’ and ‘‘female’’ are would suggest that arren and thēlus are not
identical with the English ‘‘male’’ and ‘‘female.’’
The fact that there is no distinct word for ‘‘sex’’ in classical Greek and
the—empirically veriﬁable—fact that the word genos is never used in the
Republic as a singular term to refer to a distinction in kind covering both
male and female (because it cannot be used thus) are important for the
claim that there is no concept of sex in Plato’s Republic. However, it does
not by itself oﬀer conclusive support for the claim. Rather, the claim is
made, very speciﬁcally, with reference to the precise context and function
of the word genos in Plato’s dialogue, in comparison with the function of
the modern English ‘‘sex.’’ Any objection to the claim must therefore be
made at the same level. The fact that generations of highly respected clas-
sical scholars have routinely employed the category of sex in commentary
on and interpretation of Plato’s text does not demonstrate, but merely pre-
sumes, that the modern concept is an appropriate translation, and it is pre-
cisely this presumption that this essay aims to question. This contempo-
rary context should make it clear, further, that I do not mean to suggest
that there is an ‘‘objective truth’’ of ‘‘sex’’ revealed by the modern English
word but hidden to Plato. Rather, one of the consequences of the claim that
there is no concept of ‘‘sex’’ in Plato’s Republic is that the contingency of
its modern function is revealed. If the claim is taken seriously, it will have
implications not only for how we read the Republic and other texts of the
period, but also for how we understand the status of our own concepts of
‘‘sex’’ and ‘‘gender.’’ For it would be mere presentist prejudice to imagine
that our conceptual divisions must be the right ones and that the absence
of any exact parallel with the modern concept of ‘‘sex’’ in classical Greek is
a lack.
Reading the Republic without the presumption of the modern category
of sex entails a shift of interpretive emphasis and warrants the reexamina-
tion of several main concepts. In the crucial passage at 454d–e there is a
noticeable shift from ‘‘man’’ and ‘‘woman’’ to ‘‘male’’ and ‘‘female.’’ In Lee’s
translation:
‘‘ifmenorwomenas a sex [to tōn andrōn kai to tōn gunaikōn genos] appear
to be qualiﬁed for diﬀerent skills or occupations,’’ [Socrates] said, ‘‘we
shall assign these to each accordingly; but if the only diﬀerence appar-
ent between them is that the female bears [to men thēlu tiktein] and the
male begets [to de arren ocheuein] we shall not admit that this is a dif-
ference relevant for our purpose, but shall maintain that our male and
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female Guardians [tous te phulakas hēmin kai tas gunaikas] ought to fol-
low the same occupations.’’
According to the presumption of a determining concept of sex as a baseline
supporting and regulating the characteristics ofmen andwomen, themove
from ‘‘man’’ and ‘‘woman’’ to ‘‘male’’ and ‘‘female’’ is interpreted as a descent
to the bottom line, a movement downward on a vertical plane. The desti-
nation of this downward movement is already presupposed in the transla-
tion of genos as ‘‘sex’’ and consolidated in Lee’s translation of tous te phulakas
hēmin kai tas yunaikas—literally, ‘‘our guardians [masculine gender] and the
[or ‘their’] women [or ‘wives’]’’—as ‘‘our male and female Guardians’’: that
is, according to the categories of sex.
However, without the presumption of the category of sex predetermin-
ing the interpretation, the move from ‘‘man’’ and ‘‘woman’’ to ‘‘male’’ and
‘‘female’’ might be seen as a movement, on a horizontal plane, to alter-
native designations, not foundational descriptions. Without the presump-
tion of the foundational category of sex, ‘‘man’’ and ‘‘woman’’ and ‘‘male’’
and ‘‘female’’ could represent diﬀerent ways of conceiving the diﬀerence
between groups or kinds (Plato uses genos in relation to the terms of both
conceptual pairs) across which the distinction of conditioned/conditioning
is not distributed. Indeed, onemight even see the primarily adjectival forms
of arren (male) and thēlus (female) as determinations or attributes of anēr
(man) and gunē (woman), a positionwhich, however unorthodox or counter-
intuitive, does have themerit ofmaking sense of their almost complete lack
of relevance to Plato’s argument in contrast to the role played by descrip-
tions of the possibilities for men and women.
The common assumption that the modern category of sex is central to
Socrates’ argument also involves the assumption that it drives the position
that Socrates opposes. According to this assumption, what is contentious and
radical in Socrates’ argument is his claim that the fact that females bear and
males beget is irrelevant to employment and governance. But if the pre-
sumption of the modern category of sex—which we tend to equate with
‘‘the natural’’—is removed, then Socrates’ assertion of ‘‘a very great natural
diﬀerence between men and women’’—the ﬁrst real stumbling block to his
proposals—need not be read as a reference to the fact that one begets and
the other bears. Indeed, Socrates’ argument makes much more sense (and
is certainlymuchmore interesting)when it isnot read in thisway.The objec-
tion is, rather, a much more far-reaching assertion of a diﬀerence between
men and women in every aspect of their existences, an assertion governed
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by the assumption of a set of ‘‘natural’’ characteristics peculiar to women,
including (as Socrates emphasizes) a generalized inferiority and weakness.
The question is, what is the presumed basis of this set of characteristics
peculiar to women? With the ready availability of the concept of sex, the
answer is easy: the basis of the characteristics peculiar to women is their
sex, their being-female. But if the availability of the modern concept of sex
is not presumed, then what women are as a genos is constituted by this col-
lection of characteristics, this totality of the set of womanish characteris-
tics themselves, just as much as by their being-female. Without the pre-
sumption of themodern concept of sex to carry the explanatory burden, the
‘‘nature’’ of women is not attributable to a singular ‘‘essence,’’ in the mod-
ern sense, but is composed of a uniﬁed multiplicity of behavioral and other
characteristics, including their being-female, the totality of which bears the
(now historico-)ontological weight. In modern terminology, the greater sig-
niﬁcance of the set of womanish characteristics and attributes here would
amount to the greater signiﬁcance of ‘‘gender’’ than of ‘‘sex’’; sex would be
just one of these characteristics. This is not just the claim that social and
political conditions, rather than diﬀerences in capability emanating from
the natural fact of sex, determine in any given culture what women can and
cannot do. It is the claim that the whole of the set of womanish characteris-
tics and attributes, including being-female, constitutes the basis of what a
woman is. They—and not the modern category of sex—deﬁne what it is to
be a woman in the strong sense.
As has often been pointed out, Plato’s dialogues are littered with casual
references to women deﬁned according to a set of (wholly negative) char-
acteristics, and they are historically typical in that respect. To the extent
that this is also presupposed as the background to the Republic, it is what
Socrates tries to put into question. What Socrates (unlike modern femi-
nists) must oppose is thus not the presumption of the determining role of
sex diﬀerence, but the presumption that women as a race (genos) are dif-
ferent—indeed opposite—to men in every respect, in every aspect of their
‘‘nature.’’ Accordingly, Socrates’ contentious move in the relevant passages
in the Republic is not the claim that the diﬀerent roles of the male and the
female in reproduction are irrelevant to thematter at hand. It is the reduction
of ‘‘the very great natural diﬀerence between men and women’’ to the fact
that one begets and the other bears. Philosophically, that is, Socrates’ con-
tentiousmove is themetonymic deﬁnition of the nature ofmen andwomen
in terms of being-female and being-male, the metonymic substitution of dif-
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ferent roles in reproduction for the ‘‘very great natural diﬀerence.’’ To the
extent that being-male and being-female do not have the determining func-
tion given them by themodern concept of sex, Socrates’ reduction amounts
to denying the relevance of ‘‘the very great natural diﬀerence’’ as it is usually
understood while seeming to acknowledge it. Substituting a part (function
in reproduction) for the whole (social and political being), Socrates reduces
diﬀerences that would be seen as speciﬁcally human to a kind of diﬀerence
that is common to all animals (his use of the verb ocheuein for the male role
in reproduction emphasizes this, as does the example of the guard dog).
According to this interpretation of Socrates’ argument, Aristotle’s objection
to it is not so literal after all. That is, Aristotle objects to the reduction of
the very great diﬀerences between men and women—diﬀerences in every
aspect of their social and political existences—to the relatively unimportant
diﬀerence between bearing and begetting as bare animal functions.
As this may be thought to be a contentious interpretation, it is worth
reiterating the point to make it clear. The logic of Socrates’ argument, and
the logic of Aristotle’s objection to it, suggest that what needs to be opposed
is not the idea that being-male and being-female (the fact that the one begets
and the other bears) determines all aspects of the social, psychological, and
political existences of men and women. Aristotle, it seems, objects to the
reduction of men and women to their being-male and being-female pre-
cisely because these latter cannot be seen to determine one aspect of their
social existences (broadly speaking, the division of labor) that for him is
crucial to the deﬁnition of the existences of men and women.
Thus the target and the rhetorical tenor of Socrates’ argument look rather
diﬀerent when it is not presumed, a priori, that the modern concept of sex
is operative in the text: when it is not presumed, that is, that what it is to be
a man or to be a woman—what constitutes a man as a man and a woman as
a woman—is primarily determined by their being-male and being-female.
The text suggests, rather, thatwhat constitutes aman as aman and awoman
as a woman is equally or even chieﬂy the sociohistorical norms of what
we now call ‘‘gender,’’ where this includes the attributes of masculinity and
femininity and the normative social and political roles prescribed for each.
This is not to deny, of course, that Socrates and his contemporaries were
aware of the anatomical diﬀerences between men and women. But it is to
suggest that the anatomical diﬀerences between men and women were not
necessarily understood—as they tend to be today—on the basis of a foun-
dational category of sex.
17
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Becoming Women, Becoming Men
The idea that—in the absence of a concept of sex—it is the set of woman-
ish characteristics and attributes, quite as much as their being-female, that
deﬁne what it is to be a woman sheds an interesting light on the social
prohibition of ‘‘womanish’’ behavior for men in ancient Athens and illu-
minates the arguments in Plato’s Republic and Laws against certain forms
of poetry and against men taking women’s parts in dramatic performance.
These arguments are, in part, the extension of the familiar social prohibi-
tion taken to its limit. ‘‘The gravest charge against poetry,’’ in book 10 of
the Republic, concerns ‘‘its terrible power to corrupt even the best charac-
ters, with very few exceptions’’ (605c). Even the best of us, Socrates says, on
hearing Homer represent the suﬀerings of a hero, will be carried away by
our feelings and, moreover, praise the poet who can aﬀect the listener most
powerfully in this way (605c–d): ‘‘Yet in our private griefs we pride our-
selves on just the opposite, that is, on our ability to bear them in silence like
men [hōs touto men andros on], and we regard the behaviour we admired on
the stage as womanish [gunaikos]’’ (605d–e). Admiring this behavior, feel-
ing sympathy with this behavior, entails a loosening of the control of the
best part of the soul over the lowest and leads to this kind of behavior itself
(606a–d). It leads to becoming womanish.
This also explains why, in an earlier section of the Republic before the
introduction of the idea of female rulers, it is said that the guardians, being
men (andras ontas), will not be allowed to take the parts of or imitate women
(395d). For if the set of womanish characteristics, quite as much as being-
female, deﬁnes what it is to be a woman, aman for whom these characteris-
tics, through repeated imitation, have become natural will, to some degree,
become a woman. If it is not the case that men and women are deﬁned solely
according to their being-male or being-female, the set of behavioral char-
acteristics and attributes that contribute to the deﬁnition of what it is to
be a woman are not mere predicates: they have existential status, a state of
aﬀairs that is no doubt encouraged, if not explained, by the lack of linguis-
tic distinction in classical Greek between what we now call the existential
and the predicative senses of the verb ‘‘to be.’’ These womanly characteris-
tics in aman are not therefore just accidents attached to a determiningmale
substance; they entail an existential transformation.
This existential transformation is possible,moreover, despite the fact that
males are always male. As has been pointed out, the modern identiﬁcation
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of sexwithwhat is natural leads us to think of the idea of a ‘‘woman’s nature’’
in terms of the determining role of her being-female. If, however, as Socra-
tes’ argument suggests, a woman’s or a man’s nature is equally determined
by the set of behavioral characteristics and attributes that we now call ‘‘gen-
der,’’ we can see how it is possible to conceive of the idea that womanliness
andmanliness can commute acrossmale and female. At the end of theLaws,
Plato’s Athenian protagonist imagines the ideal punishment for amanwho,
in the face of his enemy, deliberately abandons his weapons, ‘‘preferring a
coward’s life of shame to the glorious and blessed death of a hero.’’
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This
is a man who lacks andreia, ‘‘courage’’ or ‘‘manliness,’’ the chief virtue of
the hoplite. It is not, he says, within mortal power to change such a man
into a woman (eis gunaika ex andros metabalousa) as a god once changed
Kaineus the Thessalian into a man—that is, it is not within mortal power
to eﬀect the physical transformation from male to female. But the decreed
punishment shall be the next best thing, ‘‘the closest possible approxima-
tion to such a penalty: we can make him spend the rest of his life in utter
safety’’ (944e), never being appointed to any soldierly position, as he has,
because of his own nature, given up on or been debarred from the risks
that only men can run (apheisthai tōn andreiōn kindunōn kata phusin) (945a).
The man who lacks manliness shall be treated like the woman he really is
by nature,
19
a nature that his male anatomy does not override. In this case,
indeed, anatomy contradicts nature. His being-male cannot ensure that he
is a man when his behavior has proved him to be a woman.
Para doxan
The possibility for womanishness, understood in this way, to commute
across male and female is recognized in the Republic and the Laws in the
prohibition of behaviors that would encourage it.To some extent, this same
commutability of womanishness and manliness is also the ultimate basis
for the possibility of Socrates’ proposals concerning women in the Republic.
For Plato and his contemporaries, the set of characteristics and attributes
that contribute to the deﬁnition of women as women includes ﬂightiness,
untrustworthiness, secretiveness, lack of self-control, and tendency to ex-
tremes of emotion (the list could be much longer). As these are the precise
opposites of the characteristics of the guardians, and as Socrates argues that
somewomenhave thenature beﬁtting a guardian, his argumentmust imply
that some women do not have the characteristics and attributes that con-
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tribute to the deﬁnition of women as women. All that remains of this set in
Socrates’ argument—and this is the sole concession to the imaginary oppo-
nent’s objection—is the idea that women are, in all respects, weaker than
men. It is only this remainder that prevents the implication of his argument
leading to the explicit conclusion that some women (those with the nature
of a guardian) are, to all intents and purposes, men.
But this is the implicit conclusion: some women are, or could be, to all
intents and purposes, men, although they remain incontrovertibly female.
This conclusion seems very odd and contradictory in relation to the func-
tion of the modern concept of sex, according to which being female would
determine that one was a woman, but not in the context of the equal sig-
niﬁcance of the set of womanish and manly characteristics and attributes
in the deﬁnition of what it is to be a woman or a man. To the extent that
this conclusion intensiﬁes, rather than contradicts, the assumptions of Soc-
rates’ interlocutors, it is ‘‘paradoxical’’ (para doxan, as Socrates frequently
says): not contrary to logic or possibility, that is, but contrary to convention
and to what is taken to be desirable. In this context it is always possible that
women might become men—a possibility that is both feared and socially
prohibited.
20
Socrates’ innovation is to endorse and promote this possibility
as an alternative to the womanly woman with the set of conventional char-
acteristics and attributes described elsewhere in Plato’s dialogues.
The idea that some women might—indeed, ought to—become men has
been the target of one form of the feminist critiques of Plato, articulated
most vigorously, perhaps, by ArleneW. Saxonhouse, who speaks of the ‘‘de-
sexed and unnatural females’’ of Socrates’ imagination, repeating the objec-
tion of Socrates’ imaginary opponent in a modern form:
As Socrates attempts to turn women into men by making them equal
participants in the political community, he ignores the peculiar natures
of each and thus undermines the perfection of the political society in
the Republic. . . . If one’s phusis [nature] is deﬁned by that which one
does better than anyone else, then Socrates has disregarded the phusis
of the female.
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Saxonhouse makes this argument in the context of a defense of what she
sees as the ‘‘natural role’’ of women, determined by their ‘‘peculiar biologi-
cal qualities.’’
22
It is based on the unexamined modern concept of ‘‘sex’’
functioning as both the ‘‘real property’’ securing the arguments and the
thing secured by them, the thing mortgaged and the loan itself. Although
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Saxonhouse is by no means representative of the many feminist readings
of book 5 of the Republic, this concept of sex is the common assumption
that cuts across them all.Without this assumption, I have argued, the con-
text of the discussion of Socrates’ proposals is realigned, and the speciﬁcity
of his argument—its simultaneous immersion in and divergence from the
assumptions of his contemporaries—emerges more clearly.
This speciﬁc analysis reveals a general point, relevant across the various
disciplinary attempts to think sex politically. It reveals the historical speci-
ﬁcity of the modern concept of sex, a concept whose general, conservative
ideological function, in its association with the idea of a ﬁxed, immutable
‘‘nature,’’ is tomark a universal and unchallengeable diﬀerence, located now
at the level of the biological, with reverberations throughout the social and
political spheres. Thinking sex politically thus means questioning not just
assumptions about sex, but the assumption of the givenness of the concept
of sex itself.
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